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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

ROBERT E. CONGER,

]

Appellant,

i

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

i

Case No. 870129-CA

vs.
TEL TECH, INC.,
Respondent.

]

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Jurisdiction

to hear

this appeal

is conferred

upon

this Court by Utah Const., art. VIII# §§ 3 and 5, and by Utah
R. App. P. 3 and 4.
This action was filed in the Third Judicial District
Court

in and

damages

for Salt Lake County, seeking the recovery of

for personal

injuries.

On motion

of defendant

Tel

Tech, Inc., the lower court entered a final order of summary
judgment dismissing the lawsuit as against that defendant on
October 3, 1984.

An order denying plaintiff's motion to amend

and/or for relief from judgment pursuant to Rules 59(a)(7) and
60(b)(7) was entered on December 6, 1984.
those final orders.

This appeal is from

Final judgment adjudicating the claims of

all of the parties was entered January 12, 1987.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to Tel Tech
on the ground it owed no duty to
plaintiff, where material issues of
fact exist as to the existence of that
duty.

II.

Whether the district court erred in
ruling that Tel Tech did not breach any
duty it owed, despite the existence of
material issues of fact.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The Nature, Course and Disposition of the Case in

the Court Below.
On

September

("Conger")

filed

a

2,

1982, appellant

complaint

seeking

Robert

damages

injuries against Tel Tech, Inc., etc.

E.

for

Conger

personal

The gravamen of the

complaint against Tel Tech charged that Tel Tech owed and had
assumed a duty to provide a safe way of cleaning out a milk
tanker it had contracted to modify for this purpose and Tel
Tech had negligently breached this duty, proximately resulting
in injuries to Conger

(Index, pp. 2-5). Tel Tech denied the

material allegations of the complaint

(Index, pp. 44-48).

On

July 23, 1984, Tel Tech filed a motion for summary judgment
(Index, pp.
memorandum
349-353).

185-187),
decision

which

dated

the

lower

September

court

20,

granted

1984

(Index,

in a
pp.

The court's decision was grounded on its conclusion

that, based on its view of the factual setting, Tel Tech owed
no duty to plaintiff.

In its amended summary judgment signed

on October 30, 1984, however, the lower court, in a somewhat
ambiguous statement, ruled as a matter of law that Tel Tech
"breached

no

duty

owed"

to

the

plaintiff

and

ordered

the

lawsuit against Tel Tech dismissed with prejudice (Index, pp.
363-365).

On November 6, 1984, plaintiff appealed specifically
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from this ruling, and the lower court denied plaintiff's motion
for

relief

and

entered

judgment

on

December

6,

1984.

By-

stipulation, the case against defendants other than Tel Tech
and

Western

General

Dairy,

dismissed on January 12, 1987

Inc.

was

settled

and

(Index, pp. 620-621A).

ordered
A notice

of appeal was filed on February 4, 1987 (Index, pp. 622-626).
B.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff Robert E. Conger was employed by Beatrice
Foods Company, Meadow Gold Division (hereafter "Meadow Gold").
In the course of Conger's responsibilities on January 1, 1981,
he was walking on the top of a stainless steel milk tanker at
the Meadow Gold facility in Salt Lake City to connect a hose to
a "spray ball" cleaning attachment on top of the tanker, for
the purpose of cleaning out the inside of the tanker.

As he

stepped on the smooth steel skin, Mr. Conger slipped off and
fell to the ground, sustaining serious spinal injuries which
rendered him permanently and totally disabled.
Robert Conger depo. at 86, 98-103.)

(Index, p. 637,

The top of the tanker had

no grit or adhesive strips along the skin, handrails, or other
form of walk protection.

(Id. at 63).

The milk tanker at issue had been purchased by Meadow
Gold

in March of 1979.

On May 7, 1979, at the request of

Meadow Gold, Tel Tech installed two spray ball stations on top
of the tanker, towards each end of the tanker, to facilitate
cleaning the inside of the tanker in the manner that Mr. Conger
was attempting to do the day of his injury.
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(Index, p. 640,

Don Dvorak depo. at 32.)

Prior

to the time that Tel Tech

installed the spray balls, there was no need for any Meadow
Gold employees to walk along the top of the tanker.

(Index,

p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 44-45.)
Meadow

Gold had

requested

Tel Tech

to

install

the

spray balls on the tanker because it understood and relied upon
Tel Tech to have expertise in the installation and servicing of
dairy equipment and in working with stainless steel tankers.
(Index, p. 640, Dvorak depo. at 19-21.)
Meadow
instructions

Gold

gave

Tel

Tech

as to the manner of
ensure

that

the

no

directions

installation

spray

balls

or

or any steps

necessary

to

could

be

safely

operated.

Had Tel Tech installed walk protection in connection

with the installation of the spray balls, Meadow Gold would
have

accepted

and paid

for

that

walk

protection.

(Id. at

21-22.)
Tel Tech, prior to the installation of the spray balls
on the tanker in this action, had assisted in the installation
of

spray balls

on

dairy

tankers

on

at

least

five

or

six

occasions, and was aware of the fact that tankers with such
spray ball stations were often equipped with some form of walk
protection.

(Index, p. 636, Randy

Telford

depo. at 10-11;

Index, p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 9-10, 15-17.)
At the time Tel Tech installed the spray balls on the
tanker in question in May of 1979, it was acquainted with the
nature

of

dairy

facilities

and
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had

accumulated

substantial

experience in the sale and installation of dairy equipment at
dairy

facilities,

including

equipment

on

dairy

tankers•

(Index, p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 12-17, 20-23.)

Tel

Tech was also aware of the fact that dairy tankers often have
slippery

surfaces,

and

that

after

such

spray

balls

are

installed, it is recognized and assumed that persons would have
to walk on the top of the tanker to get to the spray ball
connections.

(j^* at 20-21).

Tel Tech was further aware of

the fact that due to slippery surfaces of such tankers, persons
could

foreseeably slip and injure themselves.

(Id. at 25).

Tel Tech was aware at the time that it installed the spray
balls of the availability of at least two different types of
walk protection for stainless steel dairy tankers.

(Index, p.

636, Randy Telford depo. at 10.)
Tel Tech further knew that the installation of walk
protection on tankers with spray ball assemblies was a safety
measure, and that walk protection was a common safety feature
on new milk tankers.
43-45.)

(Index, p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at

Despite Tel Tech's knowledge of the above facts, it

failed to apply any walk protection to the tanker for safe use
of the spray balls.

Moreover, Tel Tech failed to even warn or

advise Meadow Gold about the danger to Meadow Gold employees
created by Tel Tech's work on the tanker.

(Index, p. 640,

Dvorak depo. at 21.)
Defendant

Tel

Tech

filed

its

motion

for

summary

judgment with a supporting memorandum in July of 1984, (Index,
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pp. 185-187, and pp. 189-200) and Conger filed a memorandum in
opposition

to

summary

judgment

plaintiff's

(Index, pp. 214-229) and

expert,

Carl

Eilers

(Index,

an

affidavit

of

pp.

234-237).

Mr. Eilers has been involved with various aspects of

liquid food or chemical tankers for over 28 years, and is the
vice president and general manager of a company in the business
of designing, manufacturing, repairing, and servicing truck and
trailer

tanks

for

dairy

food

and

chemical

industries.

Mr. Eilers stated in his affidavit that on the tanker on which
plaintiff was injured, the addition of the two spray balls by
Tel Tech foreseeably required persons to climb on top of the
tanker and walk along the top of the tanker in order to connect
hoses to the spray balls.

The addition of such spray balls

created an obvious safety hazard, which in Mr. Eilers1 opinion
could have been corrected by the addition of some form of walk
protection

(Index,

pp.

235-236).

Mr. Eilers

testified

that

from his review of the depositions of the Tel Tech personnel,
Tel Tech, based upon its knowledge and
have

and

should have

installed

or at

its expertise, could
least

recommended

to

Meadow Gold the installation of walk protection at the time
that Tel Tech installed the spray balls (Index, pp. 236-237).
After hearing oral argument on Tel Tech's motion for
summary

judgment,

the

district

court

issued

a

memorandum

decision on September 20, 1984, granting the motion for summary
judgment on the basis that Tel Tech owed no duty to Meadow Gold
or

its

employees

to

install

walk

-6-

protection

or

to

advise

concerning the installation of walk protection at the time that
it installed the spray balls (Index, pp. 349-353).
summary

judgment

The amended

from which plaintiff appeals was thereafter

signed on October 30, 1984, (Index, pp. 363-365) and the order
of the court denying plaintiff's motion to amend or for relief
from

judgment

pursuant

to

Rules

59(a)(7)

and

60(b)(7) was

signed December 6, 1984 (Index, pp. 385-386).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court's entry of summary judgment on behalf
of Tel Tech was premised on the view that the question of duty
is purely one of law and not one of fact.

(Index, p. 350,

Memorandum Decision, September 20, 1984, p. 2.)
however,
whether

is not
a

the

duty

law of Utah where

exists

depends

on

the

This premise,

the decision
existence

as to

of

facts

concerning which the jury may reasonably come to more than one
conclusion.
existed

In this case, the question as to whether a duty

cannot

be

determined

as

a

matter

of

law?

certain

material, disputed issues of fact must be submitted to the jury.
The lower court granted summary judgment in this case
before

there was any determination

as to whether

Tel Tech

breached its duty to make its product safe or to warn of its
hazardous nature.

The determination as to the extent to which

a duty has been breached is typically a question of fact, and
here a material fact.

Because material, disputed

issues of

fact exist, summary judgment was inappropriately granted.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER TEL TECH OWES A
DUTY TO PLAINTIFF
DEPENDS ON
DISPUTED
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT AND IS, THEREFORE, A
QUESTION FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE.
In an appeal from summary judgment, the evidence and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most

favorable to the losing party.

Warren,

848

632

Transamerica
Moreover,

in

P.2d

Insurance

(Utah,
Co.,

negligence

1981)?
699

cases

granted with great caution.

accord

P.2d

summary

688

Hall v.

Blackhurst
(Utah

judgment

v.

1985).

should

be

Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney,

706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985); accord, Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d
723 (Utah 1985).

In Apache Tank Lines, the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
Issues
of
negligence
ordinarily
present
questions of fact to be resolved by the fact
finder.
It is only when the facts are
undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion
can be drawn therefrom that such issues become
questions of law.
106 P.2d at 615.

The question whether the district court erred

in concluding in the face of disputed facts that Tel Tech owed
no duty to plaintiff must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the evidence

supporting

Conger's view

exists.
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that

such

a duty

A.

Although
the
Question
Whether
a
Defendant Owes a Duty Is Generally ""a*
Decision for the Court, This General
Rule Cannot Control Where the Existence
of the Duty Depends Upon Issues of Fact
as to Which a Jury Can Disagree.

The

law

of

negligence

is

well

established

that,

generally, the question of whether a defendant owes a duty in a
particular factual setting is a question of law for the Court.
Restatement
Law

of

(Second) of Torts

Torts,

Service,

206

Inc.

(4th

v.

ed.

Kulik,

§ 328B

(1965);

1971)?

Metropolitan

621

P.2d

313

W. Prosser,

(Colo.

Gas

The

Repair

1980).

For

example, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B provides that:
In an action
determines
(a)

for

negligence

the

court

. . .

(b) whether such facts give rise to
any legal duty on the part of the defendant;
(c)
In comment

...

c to the above section, the reporter

states, "The

determinations stated in this Section are always for the court
to make."
typical

Based

on such

negligence

accepted.

statements, and with

case,

Typically,

the

this

first

above

axiom

element

of

regard

to the

is

universally

the

traditional

negligence case is well established and not in issue.

But the

law is equally well established, although less often addressed
in

the

whether

typical

negligence

a defendant

depending

on

question

then

the

owes

case,
a duty

resolution

must

be

of

submitted
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that

where

the

question

of

can be

answered

differently

material

disputed

facts,

to

the

jury.

This

is

the
well

established

in

the

Restatement

comment

on

the

above-quoted

section of 328B:
Comment on Clause (b);
It is the further function of the court
to determine whether, upon facts in evidence
which the jury may reasonably find to be
true, the law imposes upon the defendant any
legal duty to act or to refrain from acting
for the protection of the plaintiff. This
decision is always for the court. Thus it
is no part of the province of a jury to
determine what duty a possessor land owes to
an undiscovered trespasser.
(See § 333.)
Where the existence of the duty will depend
upon the existence or nonexistence of a fact
as to which the jury may reasonably come to
either one of two conclusions — as* for
example, whether the trespasser was in fact
discovered — then it becomes the duty of
the court to instruct the jury as to the
defendant's duty, or absence of duty? if
either conclusion as to such fact is drawn.
(Emphasis added.)
With regard to this issue, the example in the comment
of the Restatement is enlightening.

In some states, the duty

by a possessor of land to a trespasser depends on whether the
trespasser was in fact discovered by the landowner.
court would normally determine

(prior to trial) whether the

possessor of land owed any duty to the trespasser.
question

whether

the

disputed

by

parties,

possessor

the

trespasser
then

Thus, the

was

discovered

the

issue

owes a duty must be submitted

of

to the

But if the
or

not

whether

is
the

jury under

appropriate instructions that would allow the jury to continue
their deliberations if they found the existence of a duty, and
to end their deliberations if they found an absence of a duty,
depending on how they resolve the disputed issue of fact.
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Utah law also provides that the question of whether a
duty

exists depends

on

factual

issues.

Alarm, 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983).

DCR,

Inc. v. Peak

For example, the Utah

Supreme Court has recognized with regard to a negligence claim
arising out of a contract for services between parties, that a
duty of due care can arise out of that relationship, and that
the existence of the duty depends upon the proof of the nature
of the relationship between the parties.

j^I.; Gitzhoffen v.

Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Association, 32 Utah 46, 88 P.
691, 696 (1907) ("While it may be said that this is an action
of tort, and not on contract, nevertheless, in such an action,
a

plaintiff

seeking

to

recover

injuries

sustained

by

him

through the negligence of another must show that the latter
committed

a breach of some duty owing

imposed for his benefit.

to the plaintiff or

To show what that duty was, it was

proper to aver and prove the relationship between the parties").
Here, as shown in the statement of facts and discussed
in more detail below, plaintiff demonstrated to the district
court ample evidence of Tel Tech's expertise and knowledge, as
well as the relationship between Meadow Gold
which gave rise to a duty
employees

who would

upon

Tel Tech

foreseeably be exposed

dangerous condition which Tel Tech created.

and Tel Tech,

to Meadow
to the

Gold's

tanker's

Thus, the district

court was clearly faced with the exception to the general rule
set forth above, and erred by removing the determination of the
factual issue from the jury.
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B.

Cou r t
The
District
.,.
Failed
to
Acknowledge the Specific Circumstances
of This Case Requiring the Submission
of the Duty Issue to the Jury,

As noted in the statement of facts above, Tel Tech was
aware that surfaces in the dairy industry are slippery; that a
Meadow Gold employee using the cleaning system installed by Tel
Tech

would

walk

on

top

of

the

tanker

to

the

spray

ball

connections; and that a person could foreseeably slip from a
tanker

and

be

injured

in

the

absence

of

walk

protection.

Meadow Gold requested Tel Tech to install the cleaning system
because it knew that Tel Tech worked with stainless steel and
in the dairy industry, and Meadow Gold relied on Tel Tech's
experience and expertise to provide a new cleaning system that
could

be

safely

operated

by

Meadow

Gold's

employees.

Tel

Tech's installation of the spray balls created the danger to
Meadow

Gold

employees,

since prior

to Tel

Tech's

reason existed to be on top of the tanker.

work,

no

The spray ball

installation, however, did create a reason for such employees
to be on top of the slippery, curved tanker.
The

question

thus

arises

whether

under

these

circumstances Tel Tech had a duty either to make the cleaning
process safe by installing walk protection or to warn Meadow
Gold of the hazards.

According to Restatement

(Second) Torts

§ 403, Tel Tech unquestionably had such a duty:
§ 403.

Chattel Known to Be Dangerous

One who as an independent contractor makes,
rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another and
turns it over to the other, knowing or having

-12-

reason to know that his work has made it
dangerous for the use for which it is turned
over, is subject to the same liability as if he
supplied the chattel. (Emphasis added.)
The liability of a supplier of chattel is set forth in
Restatement (Second) Torts § 392.

§ 392. Chattel Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies to another, directly or
through a third person, a chattel to be used
for the supplier's business purposes is subject
to liability to those for whose use the chattel
is supplied, or to those whom he should expect
to be endangered by its probable use, for
physical harm caused by the use of the chattel
in the manner for which and by persons for
whose use the chattel is supplied
(a)
if the
supplier
fails
to exercise
reasonable care to make the chattel safe for
the use for which it is supplied, or
(b) if he fails to exercise reasonable care to
discover its dangerous condition or character,
and to inform those whom he should expect to
use it.
The district court recognized the similarity of § 403 to Tel
Tech's situation, but then erroneously concluded as a matter of
law that § 403 was "distinguishable," because it found that
"[u]se of the sprayballs did not make the tanker any more or
less dangerous than it was before" and that as long as Tel
Tech's work "does not cause the equipment to be dangerous, [Tel
Tech] should

not be held

liable

equipment in a dangerous way."
at pp. 3 and 4.)
these pure

if

the

owner

applies

the

(Index, pp. 351-352; Addendum 1

Given the above-referenced factual setting,

findings of

fact by the trial

improper.

-13-

court

are wholly

The trial court had before it the affidavit of Carl
Eilers

(Index,

designing,

pp.

234-237),

manufacturing

and

who

is

repairing

in

the

tanks

business

for

the

of

dairy

industry and who, like Tel Tech, installs cleaning systems for
milk tankers.

Eilers, based upon his review of the evidence,

as well as his expertise and knowledge, provided his opinion
that the installation of the spray balls did make the tanker
more dangerous than it had been.

He further stated

that a

reasonable person in Tel Tech's position installing such spray
balls would foresee the danger posed by the new cleaning system
and would either provide safety measures and/or warn the buyer
of

the

cleaning

potential

hazard

system would

to

which

expose

the

installation

workers•

of

the

(Index, pp. 234-237,

Carl Eilers Affidavit, pp. 1-2.)
Tel Tech, on the other hand, asserts that it is not in
the business of installing walkway guards, ladders or other
safety equipment
forewarn

and thus owes no duty to make

customers

of

the

hazards

its

safe or to

alterations

pose.

(Index, p. 633, Leonard Telford depo. at 43; Index, p. 636,
Randy Telford

depo. at 11-12.)

Clearly, this

is a factual

issue that goes to the heart of whether Tel Tech owes a duty.
The Utah Supreme Court

recently

judgment in a case similar to this one.

reversed

a

summary

In Williams v. Melby,

699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), the court ruled that an affidavit
produced by an architect alleged sufficient facts as to whether
negligence

in the design, construction, or maintenance
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of a

third-story window in an apartment created an unreasonable risk
to occupant

safety.

In Melby, a third-story bedroom window

placed 22 inches above the floor gave way when the plaintiff
arose from her bed during the night, stumbled and fell through
the closed window.

The Court held that the issue of both the

landlord's and the contractor's liability was to be submitted
to the fact finder on remand.
reasoning

in Becker

v.

IRM

The Melby decision followed the
Corp.,

144 Cal.App.3d

321, 192

Cal.Rptr. 570 (1983), stating;
The court set aside a summary judgment
because the case presented a factual issue
as to whether the landlord could have
learned of the defective condition of the
property. Similarly here, a trier of fact
might find that the landlord should have
known that a defective condition existed and
should have taken precautions to avert the
risk. Therefore, since we cannot hold as a
matter of law that the plaintiff was equally
or more negligent than the Melbys, a triable
issue of fact exists as to whether the
Melbys breached their duty of care.
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 728.

In this case, at minimum,

there is an issue of fact as to whether Tel Tech knew or should
have known that its modification of the tanker created a new
hazard and thus whether Tel Tech had a duty to avert that
hazard.
Tel
accepted
installed

Tech

claimed,

as established
according

and/or direction.

and

fact,

to Meadow

the
that

trial

court

apparently

the cleaning

system was

Gold's

specifications,

design

Using this unsupported factual premise, the

court relied on Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th

-15-

Cir. 1973), as authority to grant summary judgment to Tel Techf
finding that Spangler was the case "which is most nearly on
point."

(Index, pp. 349-353; Addendum 1.)

is significantly different.

Spangler, however,

There, the manufacturer did not

include a warning bell on the crane it manufactured according
to

the

plans

and

specifications

specifications

did

not

include

of
any

the

customer.

warning

Those

device.

The

Spangler court further noted that the manufacturer had relied
upon the customer's expertise.

No such evidence was before the

trial court here.
In contrast, in Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 729
(Utah 1985), a contractors
construction

of

liability

a defective

for negligence

window was determined

in the

to be a

question for the jury because the contractor chose the design
and approved

the plans for construction.

Melby

specifically

distinguished Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co., 17
Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965), a case relied upon by Tel Tech
below on this issue.

Where the contractor chooses the design,

he is responsible to avoid unreasonable risks created in the
final product.
instant

Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 729.

case,

no

specifications

or

In the

instructions

for

installation at all were given by Meadow Gold, according to Don
Dvorak, the Meadow Gold manager who contacted
installation of the cleaning system.
depo. at

21-22.)

cleaning

system.

He

simply

(Id.)

placed
Had
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Tel

Tel Tech for

(Index, p. 640, Dvorak
an

oral

Tech

order

for

installed

the
walk

protection.
20-21•)
with

Meadow

Gold

would

have

accepted

it*

(IcL

at

In fact, Meadow Gold relied upon Tel Tech's expertise

stainless

equipment.

steel

tankers

and

the

installation

of dairy

(Id. at 21-22.)

Tel

Tech

contracted

to

alter

the

tanker

to

allow

cleaning through the spray ball devices which were situated by
Tel Tech in such a way as to cause the hazardous situation.
Tel Tech cannot claim ignorance of the environment in which the
cleaning system would be used.

It knew the spray ball system

was for cleaning out milk tanks; it knew the placement of the
spray ball connections would

inevitably

walking on the top of a tanker?

lead to an employee

it knew the dairy products

created a slippery environment? and it knew that in the absence
of walk protection on the tanker top, persons could slip and be
injured.
C.

u ta
Under
. ft
Law,
the
Issue
of
Foreseeability of Harm Is a Question of
Fact.

The foreseeability of harm is also a matter for the
trier

of

fact

negligent.
(Utah 1983).

even

Harris

where

v. Utah

a

later

Transit

actor

is

Authority,

likely

to be

671 P.2d

217

As indicated in Restatement (Second) Torts § 447,

which was adopted in Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980), a person's negligence
is not superseded by another's
negligence is foreseeable.
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negligence

if the subsequent

In
created

a

the

instant

situation

case,

where

a

Tel

Tech's

reasonable

cleaning

person

foreseen the possible harm that could result.

system

would

have

As such, Tel

Tech had a duty to make the situation safe rather than simply
ignore the hazard it had itself created.

Tel Tech failed to

make the milk tank# as modified by its cleaning system, safe
for use.
Even

if

Meadow

Gold

or

Conger

were

subsequently

negligent in setting up its work procedures, it is an issue of
fact

whether

likelihood
cleaning

a

of

such

system

intended use.

reasonable

person

negligent

without

would

have

behavior

providing

and

safety

foreseen

the

installed

the

devices

for

its

Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra; Jensen

v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra.
The trial court's misapprehension of these principles
and its usurpation of the jury's function is demonstrated by
the statement in its Memorandum Decision that
upon the owner to use the equipment safely.
then

he,

(Index,

not

the

p. 352;

fundamentally

independent

Addendum

incorrect

1

contractor
at

statement

4.)
of

"[t]he duty is
If he does not,

is

Clearly
the

law

responsible."
this

is

according

a
to

Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, supra, and Jensen v. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra.
decision must therefore be reversed.
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The trial court's

II.
WHETHER TEL TECH BREACHED ITS DUTY TO MAKE SAFE
OR TO WARN IS A QUESTION OF MATERIAL FACT THAT
MUST BE RESOLVED BY THE FACT FINDER.
Whether a defendant breached a duty of care is, of
course, generally a question for the jury, to be determined by
whether the injury which occurred falls within the zone of risk
created by defendant's negligent conduct.
699

P.2d

723,

727

(Utah

1985);

Williams v. Melby,

Harris

v.

Utah

Transit

Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1983), accord Little America
Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982).

As stated in

Harris:
[T]he right to trial by jury is a basic
principle of our system that cannot be
allowed to be eroded by improper intrusions
on the jury's prerogative.
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 at 220.
The

language

of

the

trial

court's

Amended

Summary

Judgment is somewhat ambiguous as to whether the court found no
duty, or that Tel Tech did not breach a duty it owed.
the latter, the entry of summary

Assuming

judgment must be reversed,

under the above-referenced principles and in view of the issues
of material facts.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in determining that the issue of
duty is purely a matter of law.

Here, the issue of duty is so

intertwined with disputed and material factual issues that it
cannot be disposed of by law.
such

a duty

was

breached

Further, the question of whether

also
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requires

the

resolution

of

disputed

material

issues

of

fact

which

preclude

summary

judgment.
Summary judgment was erroneously entered on behalf of
Tel

Tech.

remanded

That
to

judgment

the

should

district

be

court

reversed

for

trial,

and

the

which

case

relief

appellant respectfully seeks.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument of this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of June, 1987.
GIAUQUE, WlfiL^AMS, WILCOX &
BENDINGKR/

ColinTP/uRtng
Attorne^LJ&Qj^-App^lant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 19th day of June, 1987,
four

true

APPELLANT

and

correct

were

mailed,

copies

of

first-class

following:
Raymond M. Berry, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Respondent Tel-Tech, I
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the

foregoing

postage

BRIEF

prepaid,

to

OF
the

ADDENDUM 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT E. CONGER,

:
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

s
CIVIL NO. C-82-7444

vs.

:

TEL TECH, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

:
:

The facts of this case, as I understand them are as follows:
plaintiff Robert E. Conger is an employee of Meadow Gold Dairy
(a division of Western General Dairies).

He was injured on

January 1, 1981 when he fell from a Meadow Gold truck.

At the

time, he was walking along the top of the tanker truck.
About one year and eight months prior to the accident,
defendant Tel Tech had installed two "sprayball stations" on
the tanker.
tanks.

These are used to facilitate the cleaning of the

The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to th«

plaintiff would indicate that it was not necessary to walk or
top of the tanker before the sprayballs were installed; bu1
after the sprayballs were installed the usual method of operating
the cleaning system was to walk up the ladder to one station
hook it on, and then walk along the top of the tank to the othe
station.
fell.

This is what the plaintiff was doing at the time h

CONGER V .

TEL TECH

PAGE TWO

There were other ways to operate

MEMORANDUM DECISION

the system,

however •

For example, a s t e p ladder could be used on each end of the
truck (Randy Telford Dep. p. 23), also a swinging walkway could
he used (Leonard Telford Dep. p. 21) •
The p l a i n t i f f ' s
installed

theory i s that Tel Tech should not have

the s p r a y b a l l s without a l s o

installing

a walkway,

r a i l or other p r o t e c t i v e device, or at l e a s t should have warned
Meadow Gold that such a device was advisable.
The i s s u e i s one of duty; the question i s whether one who
installs

or r e b u i l d s equipment has a duty to i n s t a l l , or at

l e a s t recommend additional safety devices which make the equipment
safer to use in various a p p l i c a t i o n s .
There are additional questions, such as whether the danger
was o b v i o u s , whether Meadow Gold had more or l e s s
and e x p e r t i s e than Tel Tech, and so f o r t h .
questions,

experience

But these are factual

not amenable to r e s o l u t i o n upon Summary Judgment.

The question of duty, however, i s purely one of law.
This c a s e i s similar t o , but not p r e c i s e l y i d e n t i c a l with
those cases where an independent c o n t r a c t o r performs work in
compliance with the owner 9 s plans and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .
cases uniformly hold t h a t there i s no l i a b i l i t y ,
plans are so d e f e c t i v e
reasonable person.

These

unless

the

t h a t they would not be followed by a

In t h i s case, however, there were no formal

plans or s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .

CONGER V. TEL TECH

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The case is also similar to, but distinguishable from the
situation described in Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 403,
where an independent contractor rebuilds a chattel, and then
turns it over to the owner in a condition dangerous for ordinary
use.

The critical distinction here is that the actual work

performed, the installation of the sprayballs, was not improper
in any way.

Use of the sprayballs did not make the tanker any

more or less dangerous than it was before.

It was the application

of the truck with its sprayballs, i.e., walking on top of the
truck, that created the danger.
I believe that the case cited which is most nearly on point
is Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373

(4th Cir. 1973).

In that case Kranco had installed a crane properly, but had
not installed a bell or warning device.

The court held that

there was no duty to do so, because the need for the device
depended upon the environment in which the crane was to be used.
Similarly, whether a walkway was needed on the milk truck dependend
upon what equipment Meadow Gold had, and what its work rules
were.
The converse view is expressed by Judge Butzner in the
dissent in the Spangler case.

I do not believe that any of

the Utah cases provide guidance as to which approach should
be followed.
balance:

There are two important competing policies in

the right of the injured workman to recover, when

CONGER V .

TEL TECH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE FOUR

he r e a l l y had no c o n t r o l over the environment in which the
was to b e u s e d ;
requested

w i t h o u t making

use,

application

used.

I believe

Spangler

and the r i g h t of a c o n t r a c t o r
inquiry

and environment
t h a t on b a l a n c e

is correct.

t h e work he i s

further

A contractor

asked

t o perform work

as t o

the

in which the o b j e c t
the

v i e w of

truck

specific
is

to be

the majority

in

should be allowed to perform

t o perform w i t h o u t

imposing a duty upon

him to i n v e s t i g a t e the u s e s to which an owner w i l l put the e q u i p ment.

So l o n g

a s he p e r f o r m s

his

work in a workmanlike way,

and h i s work does not cause the equipment t o be d a n g e r o u s ,
should

not

be h e l d

in a dangerous way.
safely.

If

if

t h e owner a p p l i e s

If,

as

in

t h e same p o s i t i o n

this

case,

as i f

requested

t h e owner

for

Summary Judgment

to prepare

£p

is

shielded

injured

by

is
the

setting.
is

an a p p r o p r i a t e

granted.
Order,

Mr. Wilcox and Mr. King pursuant to Rule 2.9
Dated t h i s

contractor

then the workman

he had been

n e g l i g e n c e of h i s employer in any other
The Motion

equipment

The duty i s upon the owner to use the equipment

by workmen f s compensation,

from l i a b i l i t y

is

the

he does n o t , then he, not the independent

is responsible.

in e x a c t l y

liable

he

day of September, 1984.

SCOTT DANIELS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Mr. B e r r y

and submit

to

CONGER V. TEL TECH
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby c e r t i f y
of

the

foregoing

following, this

t h a t 1 m a i l e d a t r u e and c o r r e c t

Memorandum D e c i s i o n ,

postage p r e p a i d , to the

day of September, 1984s

W. Brent Wilcox
Colin P. King
Attorney for Plaintiff
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Raymond M. Berry
Mark A. Larsen
Attorneys for Defendant Tel Tech
10 Exchange place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Curtis J. Drake
Attorney for Defendant Gallagher
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jay E® Jensen
William Hansen
Attorneys for Defendant
Western General Dairy
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah -84101
George M. Haley
Attorney for Defendant Wetzel
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

copy

ADDENDUM 2

W. Brent Wilcox, Esq. (A-3464)
Colin P. King, Esq. (A-1815)
GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
500 Keacns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT POR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP .UTAH

ROBERT E. CONGER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
1

AMENDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT

]

TEL-TECH, INC., ARTHUR J.
GALLAGHER & CO., WESTERN
GENERAL DAIRY, INC. and
SCOTT WETZEL COMPANY,

>

Civil No. C-82-7444

]i

Judge Scott Daniels

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 56, defendant Tel-Tech, Inc.'s Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Publish Depositions came on
for hearing before the above-entitled court on Friday,
September 7, 1984, Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, W. Brent
Wilcox and Colin P. Kiag appearing for the plaintiff, Raymond
M. Berry and Mark A. Larsen appearing for defendant Tel-Tech,
Inc., the arguments of counsel having been heard, the
depositions of Leonard Telford, Randy Telford, William Terrill,
Morgan Gary Lunt, Michael Koenig, Don Dvorak, Anthony R. Ward,
Christopher Lawrence Wilson, Dale Jackman and Vern Thurgood

were published, arguments of counsel having been heard, and the
court having founded as a matter of law, Tel-Tech, Inc.
breached no duty owed to the plaintiff.
NOW, THEREFORE, Summary Judgment that plaintiff take
nothing from defendant Tel-Tech, Inc., and the action as to the
defendant Tel-Tech, Inc. is hereby dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits.
DATED this J \ )

day of October, 1984.

BY THE COURT:

id.
Jttdge S c o c t D a n i e l s
0936v

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Amend Summary Judgment
and Amended Summary Judgment was served upon counsel listed
below by mailing a true and corslet copy thereof, first-class
postage prepaid, on this

l r v d a y of October, 1984:

Raymond M. Berry, Esq.
Mark A. Larsen, Esq.
Snow, Christensen 6 Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110
Attorneys for Defendant
Tel-Tech, Inc.
William J. Hansen, Esq.
Christensen, Jensen & Powell
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Attorneys for Defendant
Western General Dairies, Inc.
Curtis Drake, Esq.
Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Attorneys for Defendants
Gallagher & Co.
George Haley, Esq.
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City,. Utah
84111
Attorneys for Defendants
Scott Wetzel Co.

0936w

^S

ADDENDUM 3

RAYMOND M. BERRY - A0310
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant TelTech
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT E. CONGER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

ORDER

:

TELTECH, INC., ARTHUR J.
GALLAGHER & CO., WESTERN
GENERAL DAIRY, INC., and
SCOTT WETZEL COMPANY,

:

Civil No. C82-7444
Judge Scott Daniels

:

Defendants.
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and/or for Relief from Judgmenl
Granting Defendant TelTech1s Motion for Summary Judgment came
on for hearing before the above-entitled Court on Friday,
November 30, 1984, Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, W. Brent
Wilcox and Colin P. King appearing for the plaintiff, Raymond M.
Berry and Mark A. Larsen appearing for the defendant TelTech, Ir
Curtis J. Drake appearing for Gallagher & Co., the arguments of
counsel having been heard and the Court being fully advised in
the premises,
NOW THEREFORE, plaintifffs Motion to Amend and/or for
Relief from Judgment Granting Defendant TelTechfs Motion for

Summarv Judgment is denied.
DATED this

I-

day of December, 1984.
BY THE COURT:

SCOTT DANIELS, District Judge
APPROVES AS TO FO
• -T* -y —

.~v

W. 3RENT WILCOX
COLIN ?. KING
Attornevs for Plaintiff

H^n

S?\

u..-»#.
fry

7

RAYMOND M. £ERRY
MARKKA. LARSEN
A t t o r n e v s f o r Defendant TelTech
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